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IN THE SUPRE.ME C.QURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOOELE CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
SETTLEl\IENT CANYON IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
8395 
Plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory judgment, 
in "\vhich it was alleged that it was the successor in in-
terest to two contracts entered into by defendant as 
First Party and Thomas L. and Annie L. DeLaMare as 
Second Parties, dated, respectively, April 8, 1910 and 
October 4, 1910. Copies of these contracts were attached 
to the petition as Exhibits A and B and are nearly iden-
tical in language, the first covering 100 gallons of water 
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per minute and the second covering 160 gallons of water 
per minute. The execution of these contracts, and that 
the plaintiff is the successor in interest of the DeLa-
Mares thereunder, is admitted by defendant in its ans-
wer. 
For the convenience of the court we here set forth 
haec verba the first contract and those parts of the se-
cond contract which differ from the first. 
"THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this 
8th day of April A.D., 1910, by and between SETTLE-
MENT CANYON IRRIGATION COMPANY, a cor-
poration organized and exisiting under the laws of the 
State of Utah, with its principal place of business at 
Tooele City, Utah, the party of the first part, and 
THO~!fAS DE LA l\!ARE and ANNIE L. DE LA MARE, 
his wife, of Tooele City, Tooele County, State of Utah, 
the parties of the second part, WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the parties of the second part have 
developed, by means of a tunnel and other work in Settle-
ment Canyon, near Tooele City, Utah, a flow of water, 
and have turned the water, so developed, into Settlement 
Canyon Creek and thereby increased the volume of 
water naturally flowing in said Creek; and 
WHEREAS, the first party is the owner of the 
right to use the larger part of said Settlement Canyon 
Creek 'vater; and 
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WHEREAS, the following resolution was adopted 
and passed by unanimous vote of the Board of Directors 
of said Settlement Canyon Irrigation Company on the 
12th day of November 1909, the owners of two thirds of 
all the capital stock in said corporation having consented 
to and authorized the same, to-wit: 
BE IT RESOL \TED by the Board of Directors of 
the Settlement. Canyon Irrigation Company that said 
Company hereby recognizes and declares the right of 
said Thomas De La Mare and Annie L. De La Mare to 
recover from said Creek a continuous and perpetual flow 
of one hundred gallons of water per minute, in lieu of 
the water developed and added to the natural flow of 
said creek by them, and that the said flow of one hundred 
gallons of water per minute, which the said Thomas De 
La Mare and Annie L. De La Mare are entitled to recover, 
as aforesaid, may be taken and diverted by them, their 
heirs and assigns from the water flowing out of that cer-
tain tunnel, situated in the Southwest Y-1 of the South-
west 14 of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 West, 
of the Salt Lake l\1eridian, and from which the Tooele 
City Water Company now takes its water for supplying 
the inhabitants of Tooele City; 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the President 
and Secretary of this corporation be, and they are hereby 
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authorized to execute and deliver In the name of the 
Company, attested by its corporate seal a proper agree-
ment between the said Company and said Thomas De 
La 1\Iare and Annie L. De La Mare to carry this resolu-
tion into effect. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the pre-
mises and of the sum of one dollar by each of the parties 
to the other paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknow-
ledged, the said party of the first part agrees to and 
does hereby recognize and declare the right of the parties 
of the second part to recover from said Creek a continu-
ous and perpetual flow of one hundred gallons per min-
ute, of the water belonging to the party of the first part, 
in lieu of the water so developed and added to the natural 
flow of said Creek by the parties of the second part ; 
and the first party further agrees that the said continu-
ous and perpetual flow of one hundred gallons per min-
ute of the water belonging to the party of the first part, 
to which the parties of the second part are entitled as 
aforesaid, may al\vays be taken and diverted by them, 
their heirs or assigns, from the water flowing out of the 
certain tunnel, situated in the Southwest 1,4 of the South-
west 14 of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 West 
of the Salt Lake Meridian, and from which the Tooele 
City Water Company now takes water for supplying the 
inhabitants of Tooele City. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have 
caused these presents to be duly executed the day and 
year first above written. 
(Seal) SETTLEMENT CANYON 
IRRIGATION COJ\IP ANY 
/s/ Frank W. Frailey By /s/ John ~f. McKellar 
Secretary 
/s/ Wm. Marks 
Witness 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF TOOELE 
President 
/s/ Thomas DeLa Mare 
/s/ Annie L. DeLa Mare 
On this 8th day of April, A.D. 1910, personally 
appeared before me John M. McKellar and Frank W. 
Frailey who being by me severally duly sworn for him-
self, did say that the said John M. McKellar is President 
of the SETTLEMENT CANYON IRRIGATION COM-
pANY, the corporation whose name is subscribed to the 
foregoing instrument, and the said Frank W. Frailey is 
Secretary of said corporation; that such instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a 
resolution of its board of directors, and the said John 
1L McKeller and Frank W. Frailey duly acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
(Seal) 
1fy Cominission expires 
/s/ Wm. S. Marks 
Notary Public 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF TOOELE } ss. 
On this 8th day of April, A.D., 1910, personally 
appeared before n1e Thomas De La Mare and Annie L. 
De La Mare, his wife, signers of the foregoing instru-
ment, who severally duly acknowledged to me that they, 
and eaeh of them, executed the same. 
(Seal) 
My Commission expires June 19, 1912 
/s/ Wm. Marks 
Notary Public 
Recorded at the request of Henry Doremus, April 
18th, 1910, at 30 minutes past 10 o'clock A.M. in book D 
of Bonds and Agreements page 438. 
/s/ Fred Bryan 
Recorder Tooele County, Ut. 
Fees $2.50 
The resolution quoted in the third Whereas clause 
of the Second contract recites that the defendant "re-
cognizes and declares the right of Thomas De La Mare 
and Annie L. De La Mare to recover from said Creek 
a continuous and perpetual flow of Four Hundred Fifty 
450 gallons of water per minute in lieu of the water 
developed and to be developed and added to the natural 
flow of said Creek by them, and that the said flow of 
450 gallons of water per minute which the said Thon1as 
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De La 1\Iare and Annie L. De La Mare are entitled to 
recover, as aforesaid, n1ay be taken and diverted by 
them, their heirs and assigns from the water flowing 
out of that certain tunnel," describing the same tunnel. 
The Second contract adds a ne'v Whereas clause as 
follows: 
"AND WHERAS, since the passage of said resolu-
tion, said Thomas De La Mare has developed water so 
that he now has two hundred sixty gallons of water per 
minute in said tunnel, and that One Hundred gallons of 
said amount has already been transferred and set over 
to him, leaving one hundred sixty gallons per minute yet 
to be transferred, (only two hundred sixty of said four 
hundred fifty gallons having been developed) and the 
parties hereto mutually agreeing to annual said resolu-
tion as to the one hundred ninety gallons per minute not 
developed." 
The "NOW, THEREFORE," part of the Second 
contract is identical with the same part of the first con-
tract, except it specifies 160 gallons of water per minute 
and adds that that quantity is "in addition to the 100 
gallons per minute heretofore transferred." 
In addition to the foregoing, the following matters, 
alleged in the petition, are admitted by defendant's ans-
wer: 
The DeLaMares, by n1eans of tunneling and other 
\vorks in Settlement Canyon developed and brought 
water into and commingled the same with the flow of 
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Settlement Canyon Creek thereby increasing the flow 
of said creek. After· developing said water, the DeLa-
~Iares entered into the said contracts with defendant, 
and into contracts with other parties also entitled to use 
-vvater from said creek, to define and compose the rights 
of the DeLal\fares to the water so developed by them 
and to provide a point in the Canyon at which they should 
be entitled to divert and take the water developed by 
them. At all times since the execution of said contracts 
260 gallons of water per minute have been taken by plain-
tiff's predecessors in interest, and by plaintiff, from the 
point of diversion fixed in the contracts (commonly 
known as Rench tunnel) until1954, when a dispute arose 
as to the right of plaintiff to take 260 gallons per minute. 
Defendant contended that under the contra~ts plaintiff 
could take that quantity only if that quantity was flow-
ing from the DeLaMares tunnel. It is the contention of 
the plaintiff that under the terms of the contracts it was 
entitled to a perpetual and unconditional flow of 260 
gallons of water per minute from the diversion point 
fixed by the contracts regardless of the quantity flowing 
from the DeLaMares tunneling and workings, whether 
greater or less than 260 gallons per minute. 
The foregoing matters being admitted, the sole issue 
involved in the action was a proper construction of the 
contracts; that is, whether the language of the contracts 
supports the plaintiff's or the defendant's contention. 
Accordingly, to have this issue determined, the plaintiff 
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filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. This 
motion was argued to and granted by the Lower Court. 
A judgment for plaintiff in harmony vvith plaintiff's con-
tention was duly entered. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
WHERE A CONTRACT IS UNAMBIGUOUS ITS MEAN-
ING MUST BE DETERMINED SOLELY FROM I'TS CON-
TENT'S. 
POINT II 
BY THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE CON'TRACTS 
IT WAS AGREED THAT THE DELAMARES WERE, AND 
PLAINTIFF AS THEIR SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST IS, EN-
TITLED UNCONDITIONALLY TO A PERPETUAL AND CON-




WHERE A CONTRACT IS UNAMBIGUOUS ITS MEAN-
ING MUST BE DETERMINED SOLELY FROM I'TS CON-
TENTS. 
The case of City of Des Moines v. City of West Des 
Moines 56 N.W. 2d 904, was an action for a declaratory 
judgment to construe a contract between the parties and 
was disposed of on a motion for judgment on the plead-
Ings. 
In 1925 the plaintiff City of Des Moines and the de-
fendant City of West Des Monies entered into a contract 
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by which plaintiff "does hereby grant" to the defendant 
"the continuing right to connect the sanitary sewer sys-
tem of said (defendant) to the sanitary system of the 
Southwest sewer as an outlet for the sanitary sewer 
system of" (defendant), the connection to be made at a 
described point. Defendant "may also connect its sanitary 
sewer system with said Southwest sewer system at any 
point where it is practicable and feasible so to do as an 
outlet." Defendant is to pay $40,000 on November 1, 1925, 
and $2000 annually for 10 years, $2500 annually there-
after for 10 years on giving notice, and "thereafter there 
shall be due and payable, by (defendant) to (plaintiff) 
an annual sum equal to 50c per capita of population of 
defendant at time of giving said notice." Further ex-
tensions of 10 year periods could be made by giving like 
notice and paying like amount per capita annually there-
after. "It is agreed that the amounts stipulated in this 
contract shall constitute compensation in full for the per-
petual use of said Southwest sewer system for emptying 
into said sewer system all sewage and liquids accumula-
ting in the sanitary system of (defendant) for the treat-
ment and disposal of the same.'" 
. Alleging that the rights of defendant city to use the 
sewer outlet under this contract were limited to defend-
ant's 1925 boundaries, plaintiff brought suit for a declara-
tory judgment to adjudicate the rights of the parties 
under the contract, defendant's boundaries having been 
enlarged by annexations in 1940, 1948 and 1950. Plain-
tiff prayed that defendant's rights be limited to sewage 
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originating within its 1925 boundaries and that new con-
tracts be required or plaintiff pay a reasonable sum for 
use of plaintiff's facilities by said portion of defendant 
city as became a part thereof subsequent to the 1925 con-
tract, or that use be enjoined. 
When the case was at issue defendant moved for 
judgment on the pleadings, which was sustained. The 
court says: 
"No language in the contract specifically 
limits the rights of defendant city to its 1925 geo-
graphical boundaries. Nor may such inference 
properly be drawn from any of its provisions. 
The provisions fixing the compensation for use 
of the outlet indicate the parties expected defend-
ant city would grow. 
"The language of the contract is plain and 
unambiguous. It clearly includes all sewage ac-
cumulating in the sanitary sewer system of de-
fendant and does not exclude defendant's sewers 
within the boundaries of defendant city as there-
after extended. We hold plaintiff was not en-
titled to relief predicated on the terms of the 
written contract." 
Duhame v. United States, 119 Fed. Supp. 192. The 
question in this case was the construction of the following 
contract provision : 
''If in the case of an increase of any existing 
tax or imposition of a new tax the contractor has 
paid such tax or charge to the Federal govern-
ment, or any person, then the prices herein will 
be increased accordingly and will be charged to the 
government." 
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Plaintiff contends the word "or any person," created 
an ambiguity "\\7hich 'Jlould permit proof that the parties 
intended to include state taxes. The court says: 
"All material facts needed for a decision on 
the issue presented are undisputed, and since the 
sole issue is one of law that is, interpretation of a 
contract provision, 've believe that it presents a 
proper situation for disposition on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. The opposing party 
cannot defeat its use by merely alleging that an 
issue of fact exists ( 107 Fed. Supp. 84). While 
a· motion for judgment on the pleadings admits 
all facts well pleaded it does not admit, inter alia, 
facts pleaded which would be inadmissible in evi-
dence at the trial. (60 F. Supp. 729). Having 
found the provision in question unabiguous, we 
have no need in this case of extrinsic evidence 
which plaintiffs propose to introduce. (Neale v. 
Hinchcliffe, 20 Ariz. 452, 189 P. 1116). Therefore 
defendant's motion is granted and plaintiffs' 
amended petition on those counts is dismissed." 
In a number of cases decided by this court the rule 
of construction as applied in the two preceding cases is 
adhered to. 
Rttthrauff v. Silver King Western Mill and Mining 
Company, 95 Ut. 279, 80 P. 2d 338. Ruthrauff acquired 
an interest in the Augusta mining claim. He also at-
tempted to acquire an additional· interest by a tax sale 
purchase of a % interest. He then gave a quit claim deed 
to Rose Brown, which stated that he and wife "do hereby 
remise, release and quitclaim to party of the second part, 
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her heirs and assigns forever, all an undivided 114 interest 
in that certain lode mining claim known as the Augusta," 
etc. Plaintiff contends that the deed only intended to 
convey the tax title interest and not that already held. 
He tried to show this beyond the face of the deed. The 
court says: 
"This is not permissible, unless the intent and 
meaning of the deed is upon its face uncertain 
and obscure. In determining intent, we are re-
strained to the language employed - to the chosen 
vehicle of the thought and purpose of its author. 
If the meaning is clear, we may not resort to ex-
traneous aids to interpret, modify, add to, or sub-
stract from its meaning. To do so would be to 
assume the function of making contracts for the 
parties under the guise of interpretation, a power 
not delegated to the courts." 
Johnson v. Geddes, 49 Utah 187, 161 P. 660. Plaintiff 
sold defendants so1ne mining property for which defend-
ants agreed to pay $21,000, $12,000 in money and $9,000 
out of the net proceeds of the mine. The money was paid 
but no mining operations were conducted and no further 
payments made, although the deed, as agreed, was de-
livered upon payment of the $12,000. The net proceeds 
were defined in the contract and the defendants were 
to determine the extent and manner of managing and 
developing the property. The plaintiff contended the 
defendants had a reasonable time to perform and when 
that time elapsed the $9,000 became due and owing, and 
brought suit for that amount. The lower court adopted 
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plaintiff's position and found that defendants, at the 
time the contract was made had stated they would im-
mediately work and develop the claims, that an examina-
tion of the claim revealed ore sufficient to pay off the 
$9,000. Reversed. 
The Supreme Court held the contract was plain and 
the language so apt as to leave no room for construction. 
"It is quite true that when the terms of a con-
tract are uncertain or obscure the court not only 
may, but it ought to, avail itself of all legitimate 
legal evidence which will shed light upon the in-
tention of the parties and upon the rights granted 
upon the one side and obligations assumed upon 
the other. A court may, however, not receive evi-
dence for the sole purpose of enlarging the rights 
upon the one side and increasing the obligations 
upon the other. Nor may a court do that simply 
because the provisions of the contract in its judg-
ment should have been made more equitable." 
Case dismissed. 
To the same effect are the following cases: Erickson 
v. Bastian, 98 Utah 587, 102 P. 2d 310; Starley v. Deseret 
Foods Corporation, 93 Utah 577, 74 P. 2d 1221; Mifflin 
v. Shike, 77 Utah 190, 292 P. 1. 
POINT II 
BY THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE CONTRA·CTS 
IT WAS AGREED THAT THE DELAMARES WERE, AND 
PLAINTIFF AS THEIR SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST IS, EN-
TITLED UNCONDITIONALLY TO A PERPETUAL AND CON-
TINUOUS FLOW OF 260 GALLON'S OF ·wATER PER MIN-
UTE. 
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In the light of the authorities above referred to let 
us examine the language of the contracts here involved. 
1. Both contracts recite in the first Whereas Clause 
that the DeLaMares have developed by tunnel and other 
work in Settlement Canyon, a flow of water and have 
turned the water so developed into Settlement Canyon 
Creek and thereby increased the volume of water natur-
ally flowing in said creek. 
2. The first contract, in the third Whereas Clause 
refers to a resolution of the Board of Directors of the 
Settlement Canyon Irrigation Company wherein the 
Board "hereby recognizes and declares the right of said 
Thomas DeLaMare and Annie L. DeLaMare to recover 
from said creek a continuous and perpetual flow of 100 
gallons of water per minute, in lieu of the water develop-
ed and added to the natural flow of said creek by them, 
and that the said flow of 100 gallons of water per minute, 
which the said DeLaMares are entitled to recover, as 
aforesaid, may always be taken and diverted by them, 
their heirs and assigns, from the water flowing out of 
that certain tunnel from which the Tooele City Water 
Company now takes its water for supplying the inhabi-
tants of Tooele City. 
3. In the Second contract the resolution of the Board 
of Directors of the Settlement Canyon Irrigation Com-
pany reads that the company recognizes the right of the 
DeJ~aMares to recover from said creek a continuous and 
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perpetual flow of 450 gallons of water per minute, in lieu 
of the water developed and to be developed and added to 
the natural flow of the creek by them, and that the 450 
gallons per minute, which the DeLaMares are entitled to 
recover, as aforesaid, may be taken and diverted by them, 
their heirs and assigns, from the water flowing out of 
that certain tunnel, describing the same tunnel as in the 
first contract. 
The Second contract contains an additional Whereas 
clause which recites that since the passage of said re-
solution DeLaMare has "developed water so that he now 
has 260 gallons of water per minute in said tunnel, and 
that 100 gallons of said amount has already been trans-
ferred and set over to him leaving 160 gallons of water 
yet to be transferred (only 260 of said 450 gallons have 
been developed) and the parties hereto mutually agree-
ing to annul said resolution as ·to the 190 gallons per 
minute not developed." 
4. Both contracts then conclude, in consideration of 
the premises and of the sum of $1.00, the Company 
"agrees to and does hereby recognize and declare the 
r~ght of" the DeLaMares "to recover from said creek a 
continuous and perpetual flow of (100) (160) gallons 
per minute of the water belonging to the" Company, "in 
lieu of the water so developed and added to the natural 
flow of said creek by" the DeLaMares. The Second con-
tract then stipulates that the 160 gallons per minute is 
"in addition to the 100 gallons per 1ninute heretofore 
transferred." 
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It is further stipulated in both contracts that' the 
company "agrees that said continuous and perpetual flow 
of (100) (160) gallons per n1inute of the water belonging" 
to the con1pany to "\vhich the DeLaMares "are entitled, as 
aforesaid, may always be taken and diverted by them, 
their heirs and assigns, fro1n the water flo\ving out of 
that certain tunnel from which the Tooele City Water 
Company now takes its water for supplying the inhabi-
tants of Tooele City." 
It is apparent that these contracts cannot be inter-
preted by simply resorting to a dictionary definition of 
the \vords "recover" and "in lieu of", as is attempted by 
the appellant in its brief. The contracts must be con-
sidered as a whole. From the foregoing resume of the 
provisions of the contract it is clear that the appellant 
recognized and agreed that the DeLaMares had actually 
developed a total of 260 gallons of water per minute by 
their "\Vorkings and that they had added that quantity to 
the flow of the creek. This was a fixed, definite quantity 
so agreed upon. There is not the slightest intimation 
that that quantity might vary above or below that quan-
tity. If there should happen to be variations, the parties 
eliminated all questions and disputes as to their respec-
tive rights contingent upon fluctuations either above or 
below 260 gallons per minute by agreeing in unequivocal 
language that that was the quantity they "'"'·ould each 
reeognize. In other words, the parties first agreed that 
the flow of the creek had been augmented by the DeLa-
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Mares workings to the extent of 260 gallons per minute 
and that that quantity of water belonged to the DeLa-
~{ares. 
Instead of agreeing that the DeLaaMres could take 
the 260 gallons per minute so diverted and turned into 
the creek by then1 at some point at or below the juncture 
of the developed water with the creek, the parties agreed 
that the equivalent quantity of water could be taken by 
the DeLaMares from the Company's water at the Rench 
tunnel, from which the Tooele City Water Co1npany then 
was taking its water. By so taking, the DeLaMares would 
recover and take the quantity of water they had devel-
oped. They could not thus recover, in the literal diction-
ary sense, the water they put into the creek, for that 
water was spilled into the creek way below the Rench 
tunnel. They could only get an equivalent quantity at 
another point of diversion, and this would be in lieu of 
the water they turned into the creek some distance below. 
The all important element in the construction of 
these contracts is, that by definite, certain, clear and 
unambigous language, the Company agreed that the De-
LaMares had acquired by their development work a 
fixed quantity of water in the amount of 260 gallons per 
minute. That being the fixed quantity basis of the rights 
of the DeLaMares the words "recovers~ and "in lieu of" 
can only mean that same quantity. 
The language of the second contract is very signifi-
cant, wherein it states that DeLaMares has "developed 
water so that he n0"\\7 has 260 gallons of water per min-
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ute in said tunnel and that 100 gallons of said amount 
has already been transferred and set over to him, leav-
ing 160 gallons per minute to be transferred." That is 
very clear, definite, and unambiguous language. Not a 
word is said about fluctuating quantities or the rights of 
parties if the water developed in the DeLaMare workings 
at any time either exceeded and became less than the 
260 gallons per minute. Nor is a word said to indicate 
that the DeLaMares could only take such quantity as 
their tunneling produced in the event it was less than 
260 gallons per minute at any particular time. The plain 
language is that 260 gallons per minute are to be trans-
ferred and set over to the DeLaMares. 
Both contracts provide that the Company agrees to 
and does hereby declare and recognize the right of the 
DeLaMares to recover from said creek a continuous and 
perpetual flow of 100 gallons per minute in the first con-
tract and 160 gallons per minute in the other of the water 
belonging to the Company. This is in lieu of the water 
developed and added to the natural flow of the stream 
by the DeLaMares. Here again the language admits of 
no uncertainty or equivocation. The flow to be taken by 
the DeLaMares is a continuous and perpetual flow in the 
quantities specified, 100 gallons per minute in the one 
contract and 160 gallons per minute in the other. 
To further emphasize that the parties were agree-
Ing to exact, unchanging and unfluctuating flows, the 
contracts use again the terms "continuous and perpetual" 
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by finally providing that such continuous and perpetual 
flow of 100 gallons per n1inute in one contract and 160 
gallons per minute in the other, to which the DeLaMares 
are entitled, as aforesaid, ''may always be taken and di-
verted by them, their heirs and assigns from the water 
flowing out of the" Rench tunnel. This clearly indicates 
a continuous and perpetual condition, running to and for 
the benefit of the heirs and assigns of the DeLaMares, 
and gives the DeLaMares a definite and fixed quantity 
that they could dispose of to their heirs and assigns. 
Could any language be more certain, clear and 
definite~ How can there be any room for reading into 
that language a meaning that the DeLaMares could only 
take such quantity as their tunnel produced if their 
tunnel produced less than the 260 gallons per minute? 
To so read the contracts would require a flagrant viola-
tion of the principles announced under Point I and would, 
in effect, be making a new contract for the parties for 
the first time in forty-four ( 44) years. 
That the fixed quantities agreed to were not inequit-
able and were not based on poor judgment is attested by 
44 years experience. But no matter what present con-
ditions may be, as stated by this court in Johnson v. 
Geddes, supra, a court may not enlarge the rights upon 
the one side or increase the obligations upon the other 
"simply because the provisions of the contract in its 
judgment should have been more equitable." 
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If the parties had intended to provide that the De-
LaMares could only take at the Rench tunnel the equiva-
lent quantity produced and emptied into the creek by the 
DeLaMares, they could easily have said so. In such 
event fixed quantities need not have been mentioned at 
all, as that would only confuse the matter. However, if 
they should use fixed quantities under such conditions, 
it would be expected that they would provide for the 
taking by the DeLaMares of water in excess of the fixed 
quantities, as well as less than the fixed quantities, if 
the tunnel produced more than the fixed quantities. 
If you assume the contracts were intended to pro-
vide for a condition wherein the DeLaMare tunnel pro-
duced less than the quantities mentioned in the contract, 
you must also assume that it was intended to provide 
for a condition wherein such tunnel produced more than 
such quantities. But significantly enough, the contracts 
do not provide for either contingency. They fixed the 
quantity of developed water and they fixed that quantity 
as the quantity to \vhich the DeLaMares are entitled and 
which they may take at the Rench Tunnel. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the contracts that the DeLaMares and 
the Company sought to do two things: First, they agreed 
between themselves as to the exact quantity of water that 
each would recognize that the DeLaMare workings had 
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produced and added to the stream and so belonged to 
the DeLaMares. This, undoubtedly, was a co1npromise, 
the chance of the DeLaMare works producing in excess 
of 260 gallons per minute being at least as great as the 
chance that they would produce less than that quantity. 
The parties assumed that the water coming from the 
DeLaMare tunnel would be as constant in flow as the 
water coming from the Rench tunnel. They made no 
provision in the contract for the contingency that either 
would fluctuate or that either would produce less or more 
than enough to fulfill the contracts. Second, they agreed 
that that quantity of water could forever be taken by 
the DeLaMares, and their successors and assigns, from 
the water the Company owned coming from the Rench 
tunnel, the Company thereby getting the water augment-
ing the creek through the DeLaMares ·works. It was in 
effect an exchange of water in a definite fixed quantity. 
No provision was made for making any measure-
ment at anv time to determine whether and when the 
of 
water produced at the DeLaMare works exceeded or 
became less than theW gallons per minute. No provi-
sion was made to provide any measuring devices to meas-
ure the flow into the creek from the DeLaMare tunnel. 
No provision was made to adjust the flow to be taken 
by the DeLaMares at the Rench tunnel to the flow com-
ing into the creek from the DeLaMare tunnel. During 
all of these 44 years no such provision has been made or 
requested. 
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We respectfully submit that the contracts are un-
ambiguous. At the hearing in the Lower Court appellant 
conceded this was the fact. It now seems to take the 
position that there is ambiguity, but wholly fails to point 
out wherein such ambiguity lies. Under the plain lan-
guage of these contracts the City, as successor in interest 
to the DeLaMares, is entitled unconditionally to 260 gal-
lons of wat~r per minute. The judgment of the Lower 
Court is correct and should be sustained with costs to the 
respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RALPH W. MILLBURN 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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the ---------------- day of October, 1955. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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